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Abstract 
We investigate the influences behind five major investigations into corporate 
governance in the UK since 1990: the Cadbury, Greenbury, Hampel and Turnbull 
Committees, and the Company Law Review. In each case we examine the roles of 
business, the authorities, public opinion and events in shaping the course of the 
investigation, its conclusions and its impact. We do this on the basis of interviews 
with members of the committees and analysis of newspaper coverage of the 
debates. The picture that emerges is one where the process of forming the 
investigating committee, its membership and its mode of operation strongly 
influence its recommendations and effectiveness. We draw conclusions that 
contrast the strong influence of the accountancy and legal professions in shaping 
the debate and the varied influence of the authorities, the media and events. 
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1. Corporate governance debates in the UK 
 
Corporate governance has been defined as ‘the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled’
1 As such corporate governance 
relates to the organisation and functioning of the company board of 
directors. In the UK the debate about corporate governance has consisted 
of a number of key elements.
2 
 
1. The duties of a director with respect to the various stakeholders in a 
company. 
2. The composition of the board with respect to the number of non-
executive (or outside) directors in comparison to executive directors 
who are also full time managers with the company. These non-
executive directors may be independent in the sense that they have no 
previous or other on-going connection with the company.   
3. The presence and composition of various subcommittees of the main 
company board: namely the audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees. The audit committee is responsible for reviewing the 
internal and external audits of the company. The nomination 
committee recommends new directors for appointment to the board. 
The  remuneration committee recommends the compensation 
packages to be offered to the executive directors. 
 
4. The separation of the roles of chairman of the board from that of 
chief executive. 
5.  The consideration of the appropriate degree of internal control 
within a company. 
6. The degree of reporting on matters of board composition and policy 
in the annual report. 
 
The 1990s have witnessed a major upheaval in the way corporations are 
governed in the UK. Beginning with the Cadbury Report in 1992 many 
corporations have been faced with a series of major changes in their 






remuneration and the process of the appointment of directors. The 
Cadbury Report was a response to the widespread view that UK 
corporate governance lagged behind that in other countries and that this 
lack of best of practice had contributed to some of the spectacular 
collapses of listed corporations such as Asil Nadir's Polly Peck, BCCI, 
Coloroll and Maxwell Communications Corporation.
3 That report was 
followed by three more major reports: Greenbury (1995), Hampel 
(1998) and Turnbull (1999). The Greenbury Report responded to 
concern about the level of executive pay rises, especially in the 
privatised utilities. The Hampel Report reviewed the progress of 
companies in responding to the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports and 
made some suggestions for improvement. The Turnbull Report 
addressed the important issue of how to implement best practice systems 
of internal control. Currently (in late 2001), the Labour Government is 
completing a wide ranging review of Company Law that addresses 




The result of all this activity is that UK corporate governance ranks as 
the most open and transparent system of any in the leading industrialised 
countries. The UK is now ranked ahead of the US in terms of the quality 
of the environment facing investors on the basis of the governance 




The issue at the heart of development of corporate governance in the UK 
has been encouragement of the appropriate exercise of power by 
executive directors. While much of the focus has been directed at the 
limitation of the risk of potential abuses of executive power, the various 
reports have sought to encourage executives to see best practice 
governance as an aid to good performance.
6 The issue of the appropriate 
exercise of executive power is a key issue in business ethics or the 'rules 










In what follows we wish to identify the major influences on the 
development of the issue of corporate governance in the UK. Our aim is 
to attempt to identify who and what have shaped the debate about this 
important aspect of business ethics in the UK. We seek to do this in the 
context of an interest in establishing how companies might strategically 
interact with emerging ethical issues. 
 
We will focus on the conduct of the committees charged with drafting 
the governance reports. We base our comments on interviews with 
members of each of the  corporate governance committees and an 
analysis of the how the issue played out in the newspapers over the 
period. The aim is to help those charged with responding to ethical 
issues how best to deal with them in the future. In section 2 we lay out 
our organising framework. Sections 3 to 6 discuss the Cadbury, 
Greenbury, Hampel and Turnbull Reports in turn. Section 7 applies our 
framework to the Company Law Review. Section 8 concludes by 
drawing together our main findings. 
 
2. A framework for Analysis 
   
Our concern is to track the influences surrounding what have turned out 
to be the central foci for debating the ethical issues surrounding the 
behaviour of UK companies since 1990. We do not seek to discuss the 
ethical issues themselves but to look at what has influenced how they 
were discussed in the UK and how these influences have shaped how the 
issues have been dealt with. Our desire is to begin to identify where 
ethical issues facing companies come from, how they develop over time 
and what determines how they will necessitate change for the company. 
We do this by identifying the key sources of influence in the corporate 
governance debate and by breaking down the phases of each governance 
committee’s work into a number of stages. In our subsequent detailed 






framework for presenting our findings on what were the most significant 
influences on the development of the process at the key stages. 
The conduct of our investigation 
 
While much has been written on the content of the different Governance 
Reports in the UK, very little has been written on how the issues have 
developed.
8 We initially collected empirical evidence through publicly 
available information, amplified by lightly structured interviews with 
key individuals in the field, taken from ethical and corporate pressure 
groups and a business school. This preliminary investigation led to the 
development of a semi-structured questionnaire for conducting personal 
interviews with members of the committees and undertaken jointly by 
the authors. Following a ‘grounded’ approach, the questionnaires were 
an aide-memoir to ensure that relevant matters were investigated. 
Consistent with this approach, a model was developed of the principal 
factors involved. 
 
Our approach was then to interview a member of each committee, other 
than the chair. The rationale of approaching someone other than the 
chair was that they would give a view of how the committee was 
conducted and of whether the prevailing view (which might be assumed 
to be consistent with the view of the chair) was held throughout the 
committee. The selection of who to interview was on the basis of 
selecting accessible individuals who were known to be thoughtful 
opinion leaders in the area.   
 
 
The Influence groups 
 
In the course of our investigation we have come across a number of 
significant influence groups in the area of corporate governance. We 
identify and discuss each of these in turn below. The influences can be 
roughly grouped into four sets: business (including corporates, non-






authorities (government and regulators), public opinion (media, NGOs 
and popular feeling) and exogenous factors (events). 
 
Corporates 
By this we mean the companies affected by corporate governance 
debates directly (as opposed to other companies such as pension funds 
concerned about the governance of companies they invest in) and key 
executives within them such as executive directors. This group also 
includes organisations that represent company interests in the UK such 
as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
9 and the Institute of 
Directors (IoD)
10. Of particular concern are the publicly quoted 
companies most effected by the Governance debates, though all 
commercial organisations, small and medium enterprises and mutually 
owned societies can be considered part of this group. 
 
Non-financial Stakeholders 
These are those who have an interest or concern in the business that is 
different from ownership. This group includes a wide group of people 
whose economic welfare depends on or is affected by the action of 
companies. This group includes supplier companies, employees (and 
their unions), customers and those responsible for the environment.   
 
Financial Stakeholders 
This group includes pension funds and investment trusts. The group is 
concerned with the impact of poor governance on the performance of the 
shares held within the portfolios they own or manage on behalf of 
others. They may also be influenced, more indirectly, by consumer 
pressure from individual investors who want to invest in responsible 
companies. This group includes ‘activist’ fund managers such as Hermes 
who have publicly opposed boards with poor performance records. The 
group is represented by the Association of British Insurers (ABI)
11 and 













Professionals are engaged in a vocation especially requiring advanced 
training or knowledge. In the case of corporate governance, these are 
particularly the accountancy and law professions. As individuals 
professionals may work for business services firms or directly as 
executives for corporates. These groups have influenced the governance 
debate via their professional bodies, namely the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants for England and Wales (ICAEW)
13 and the Law Society
14. 
The ICAEW claims to have at least one member on the board of all the 
leading companies in the UK. 
 
Politicians 
Politicians have influenced the corporate governance debate both in 
government and in opposition. In opposition politicians may co-operate 
with the media to raise business issues which might embarrass the 
government (such as with the issue of executive pay in Section 4). In 
government, politicians have the additional support of the civil service in 
organising assessments of the scope for change in the law and in 
threatening to enact legislation if the corporate sector does not take 
action. Government ministers can put high level pressure on the business 
community to act (such as the then Deputy Prime Minister was able to 
put on the CBI over executive pay in the run up to the Greenbury 
Committee). Other types of ministerial involvement may come through 
the explicit linking of business issues with a wider political agenda (as 
the first Labour Industry Secretary, Margaret Beckett, did in linking 
corporate governance issues to the stakeholding philosophy at the heart 




Corporates are regulated both by statute and by voluntary agreement. In 






being significant influences. The Bank of England (and later the 
Financial Services Authority)
15 was concerned about the role of poor 
corporate governance in corporate bankruptcy and fraud in its role of 
supervisor of the financial integrity of the City of London. The Bank of 
England had a traditional role as the overall City regulator and had set 
up Pro-Ned, an organisation promoting the use of independent non-
executive directors. The Stock Exchange
16 was similarly concerned and 
has the ability to significantly influence company behaviour via its 
control of the listing rules, such as on reporting in company accounts, 
with which companies must comply if their shares are to be traded on 
the London Stock Exchange. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC)
17 
has also been a significant player in the corporate governance debates. 
The FRC incorporates the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and the 
Financial Reporting Review Panel. In is an independent overseer of 
financial reporting in the UK and is sponsored jointly by the 
accountancy profession, the City and the government. It was itself 
established in 1990 in the wake of the high profile business failures and 
reflects shared accountancy profession and Stock Exchange interests in 
financial reporting. 
 
  Media 
The media includes the main means of mass communication. In the area 
of corporate governance this has particularly included the financial press 
and the popular newspapers who highlighted the issue of executive pay 
as it related to particular highly-paid individuals. The media has a role in 
picking up ideas which are of public interest and in giving 'airtime' to 
individuals with points of view which challenge the establishment. 
 






NGOs are 'private organisations that pursue activities to relieve 
suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, 
provide basic social services, or undertake community development'
18. 
Within corporate governance, NGOs would include lobby groups (not 
included above) and research groups who are concerned with  
governance, corporate social responsibility or ethics.  These are usually 
non-commercial, but in common with many charities, may include a 
commercial activity. A particularly notable NGO involved with 
corporate governance is Pensions and Investment Research Centre 
(PIRC)




This is the prevalent view or views held by the majority of the 
community with respect to corporate governance, or which relate more 
widely to corporate conduct or even political issues that touch on 
corporate governance. It acts as a spur to media reporting and NGO 
activity and also political concern. However it may in turn be influenced 
by the highlighting of issues by other groups. 
 
Exogenous factors 
These are occurrences believed to be outside the control of any of the 
individual actors within the economic system. Events such as a 
spectacular collapse of a high profile company may trigger a political or 
media reaction. They may also include the general state of the macro-
economy and the stock market.
20 They may affect the economy directly 
via their effect on issues of public concern or indirectly via their impact 
on corporate performance and company failure rates. We would usually 
expect failures to be lower in economic booms and hence concern for 
corporate governance to be correspondingly low. We would also expect 
public acceptance of 'normal' business practices to be higher when the 
economy and the stock market are doing well and society more generally 








The enquiry process 
 
Based on our observations of the actual enquiry processes we now set 
out the key stages of the process by which each of the governance 
committees operated. We discuss each stage in chronological order. 
 
Initial Interest 
This refers to the stage before the committee is set up during which 
those influence groups who feel strongly that they want something done 
about a particular issue make their views known. The fact that this initial 
interest is significant is what brings the committee into being. 
 
Formation of the committee  
This stage includes the appointment of the chair, key members and all 
the members of the committee. The experience and view of corporate 
governance represented in the composition of the committee is a 
significant factor in setting the nature of the discussion and in shaping 
the final report. The choice of who to chair the committee, given their 
pivotal role in inviting others on to the committee and in discerning 
consensus among mostly lay members, is very important. 
   
Terms of reference 
Here we mean the remit given to the committee. This is the official 
terms of reference given to the committee but also includes any 
redefinition or elaboration that the committee may set itself, at the 
outset, as its working terms of reference.  
 
Deliberation 
This relates to the hows and wherefores of the principal workings of the 
committee, including the nature of informal and formal consultation and 
the issuing of draft reports. This period covers the longest part of the 







Compilation of the final report 
This is how the final report is put together and what influences are 
reflected most strongly in the written conclusions given the process of 
consultation that has gone on following the issuing of the draft reports. 
 
The content of the final report 
This stage represents what the final report contains. The influences on it 
are discussed under the previous heading. In the following sections we 
note what the main conclusions of the Committee reports were. 
 
Presentation of the final report 
This relates to how the Committee’s final report is launched into the 
public domain. This includes who is present at the launch, who presents 
it and the willingness to involve the media at this final stage. This would 
include any on-going promotion of the report by the chair of the 
committee and his willingness to engage in subsequent debate 
surrounding the report. 
 
Debate 
This stage refers to the debate following the launch of the report. This 
identifies who the most influential shapers of the debate were. This 




This is the final phase and refers to who takes the responsibility for 
seeing through the enactment of the report’s principle recommendations. 
This phase is usually the longest one. This phase can be a significant 
part of the process, with the committees even staying in operation for a 
period after the publication of the report. The normal expectation 
however would be that the report is received by the sponsoring 
institutions and responsibility for overseeing the implementation process 







In our analysis we will conclude our discussion of each governance 
report with an assessment of the extent to which each of the influence 
group has influenced each stage of the enquiry process. We will assign 
one of four levels of influence to each group at each stage based on our 
assessment of the evidence. High indicates significant influence, Low a 
small influence and Medium lies in between, - implies no measurable 
impact. 
 
3. The beginning of a quiet revolution – The Cadbury Committee 
 
The UK economy experienced a prolonged period of economic growth 
from 1981 to 1989 under the Conservative Administration of Mrs 
Thatcher. However towards the end of that period the economy began to 
show signs of overheating, especially in 1987 and 1988, with sharp rises 
in GDP growth and asset prices. 1990 and 1991 were years of high 
inflation and negative growth.
21 Company failures rose and there were 
some spectacular collapses, including Asil Nadir’s Polly Peck, Coloroll, 
Robert Maxwell’s MCC and the $8bn failure of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI).
22 These collapses were all 
characterised by a number of similarities: a recent clean bill of health 
from auditors, a flamboyant and powerful leader, a lack of action from 





These collapses caused widespread public concern, not only because of 
the involvement of thousands of deposit holders in the collapse of BCCI 
and thousands of company pensioners in the collapse of the Maxwell 
Empire, but because of the perception that UK industry was doing badly 








The City was prompted to respond.
25 The Financial Reporting Council, 
the London Stock Exchange and the Accountancy Profession set up a 
committee on the Financial Aspects of  Corporate Governance in May 
1991. The Financial Reporting Council was concerned about the absence  
of accurate reporting in the major cases of failure that would have 
allowed investors to spot the warning signs. The Stock Exchange was 
concerned about the reputation of the City with investors. The 
Accountancy profession was concerned about the potential liability 
faced by auditors who signed off a set accounts which turned out be a 
misrepresentation of the facts, and about losing its self-regulatory role.
26 
The chairman of the Financial Reporting Council, Sir Ron Dearing, 
approached Sir Adrian Cadbury to chair the Committee. Cadbury had 
been chairman of Cadbury Schweppes Plc and was then chairman of 
Pro-NED, a Bank of England sponsored organisation set up to promote 
the use of independent non-executive directors in the boardroom. 
Cadbury had authored a book on how to be an effective company 
chairman
27 and was a respected figure in the City who had been head of 
a family firm. 
 
It was Cadbury himself who drew up the terms of reference for the 
Committee which were: 
 
‘To consider the following issues in relation to the financial reporting 
and accountability and to make recommendations on good practice: 
   
(a)   the responsibilities of executive and non-executive directors for 
reviewing and reporting on performance to shareholders and other 
financially interested parties; and the frequency, clarity and form in 
which information should be provided; 
(b)  the case for audit committees of the board, including their 
composition and role; 
(c)   the principal responsibilities of auditors and the extent and value 
of audit; 
(d) the links between shareholders, boards, and auditors; 
(e)    any other relevant matters.’ 
 







The Committee was formed with members
28 drawn from the CBI, the 
accountancy profession, finance directors, academia, the Bank of 
England, the Stock Exchange, the Institute of Directors, institutional 
investors
29 and the Law Society. The Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI)
30 provided a secretary to the Committee who acted as their 
observer. 
 
The Committee met monthly and produced an interim report in May 
1992.
31 It was an instant literary success, with 13500 copies being 
distributed during the consultation period. In the interim report the 
Committee came out in favour of self-regulation and put a stress on the 
role of non-executive directors
32 It did not recommend that shareholders 
have a right to vote on executive pay packages
33 or seek to reverse the 
Caparo Case in which the House of Lords ruled that auditors only have a 
duty of care to management not to shareholders
34 The enforcement 
mechanism for the new rules was to be that a statement of the extent of 
compliance with the Code in a Company's Annual Report was to be 
made a Stock Exchange listing requirement
35 
 
Non-executive directors lay at the centre of the Committee's interim 
proposals.
36  There were to be at least three independent non-executives 
on the board. The role of chief executive and chairman should be split 
with a non-executive becoming chairman. They were to form the 
membership of audit, remuneration and nomination committees. Audit 
committees would review the internal control systems in the company, 
remuneration committees would set pay for executive directors and 









The interim report attracted various types of criticism, indeed only one 
in five reactions to the interim report registered strong support.
37 From 
the business community there was the charge that the system it 
advocated was too bureaucratic. The CBI and the Institute of Directors 
were both critical of this.
38 The CBI in particular fought to get the  
requirement that compliance with the code should be part of the listing 
requirements for the Stock Exchange removed.
39 Cadbury himself and 
the CBI traded arguments in public about this.
40 Some investment groups 
suggested that it did not go far enough in recommending shorter service 
contracts for directors, improved disclosure of executive pay in 
corporate accounts and better financial information.
 41 Indeed there was 
some doubt as to whether the fundamental problem of internal control 
was being addressed.
42 Auditors felt that the requirement on them to 
verify compliance with the code was difficult to implement because of 
the difficulty of giving verifiable opinions on whether the company was 
a going concern or had appropriate internal controls.
43 Other 
commentators raised the issue of whether Cadbury’s faith in self-
regulation would mean that he would not go far enough (Finch, 1992). 
Indeed the fact that Cadbury obviously looked to the US for ideas must 
have limited his radicalism.
44 
 
Adrian Cadbury continued to stress to those in the business community 
that thought the idea of a code was too bureaucratic, that unless 
companies were seen to take action, others who did not understand 
business so well and had a more doctrinaire approach would do so (i.e. 
government legislation was a real possibility).
45 Although the CBI 
leadership was critical of the code, Adrian Cadbury won the support of 
the wider CBI membership at the CBI annual conference in early 
November.
46 Eventually he won the debate with the CBI leadership over 









The final version of the Report appeared at the beginning of December 
1992. This was similar to the draft report except that the final report 
responded to CBI concerns about the role of non-executives as 
policemen by playing down the distinction between them and executive 
directors.
48 There was also an explicit distancing of the Report from 
support for two-tier boards
49. Though many had reservations about the 
report there was widespread support in the boardroom and in the City. 
As one eminent City figure was quoted as saying  ‘you can’t be against  
it, you have to be for it’
50. The media gave it a much more mixed 
reaction ranging from a ‘raspberry’
51 to ‘an ambitious remit for self-
regulation’
52. The government reaction was positive, with the Corporate 
Affairs minister labelling it ‘an authoritative statement of what needs to 
be done in a crucial area’
53. 
 
While the general reaction in the City to the report was positive several 
chief executives who were also chairmen were critical of it.
54 BTR’s then 
chairman and CEO criticised the effect on the smooth operation of the 
board given the clear role it gave to non-executives in monitoring 
executives
55.  The cost of implementation was estimated to be at least 
10% of the annual audit fee.
56 The Stock Exchange quickly made it clear 
that it was not inclined to delist those companies who refused to 
implement the code.
57 Others pointed out that the report did not seem to 
pass the Maxwell test – preventing the collapse of another Maxwell 
Communications Corporation.
58 Some executives wanted mandatory 
backing for the Report.
59 There was also a question as to whether the 




  The state of UK plc at the time of the Cadbury report was such that only 




1.Separation of Chairman and Chief Executives 
2.A majority of independent non-executive directors 
3.An audit committee with a majority of non-executive directors 
4.A remuneration committee with a majority of non-executive directors 







The Report had set a deadline of 30 June 1993 for the beginning of 
reporting compliance with the Code. By this time 54 out of 66 reporting 
FTSE100 companies had complied with the reporting requirement.
62 The 
percentage of companies with combined CEO and Chairman of the 
board had declined from 25% to 15%. Within a year the percentage of 
FTSE350 companies with remuneration and audit committees had 
doubled and the percentage with nomination committees was rising.
63 
 
The Committee continued to meet to monitor compliance with the code. 
It set up a working party to look at the area of internal controls in the 
company. This working party was under the chairmanship of Paul 
Rutteman, a technical partner at accountants Ernst and Young. This 
committee sought to devise guidelines on how a statement could be 
made on whether a company was a going concern and how it could 
define having an adequate system of internal control. This working party 
finally reported in December 1994, two years after the original report.
64 
 
The Cadbury Committee ceased to operate in May 1995 when Sir 
Adrian bowed out with the presentation of a report on the 
implementation of Cadbury Code. This report indicated an impressive 
change in boardroom behaviour
65. Among FTSE250 companies the 
percentage with an independent audit committee had risen from 45% to 
87%; the percentage with a nomination committee had risen from 8% to 
60%; the percentage with a remuneration committee had risen from 60% 
to 98%. Only 7 companies had a combined chairman and chief executive 
with no named lead non-executive director as suggested by the code. 
The problem area for implementation was among the smallest 250 listed 
companies where although compliance had risen sharply there was still 
only a small minority of companies with independent audit or 
nomination committees.
66 There was also a problem of just looking at the 









Many institutional investors and some parts of the media had noted that 
the original Cadbury Report did not address the issue of executive pay in 
great detail
68 (focussing instead on disclosure and transparency). In 
particular the reporting of pay levels and the process for determining 
executive pay were not discussed. Into 1994 this issue began to 
dominate the financial reports in the press on corporate governance. It 
was becoming clear that this was an issue that would have to be 
addressed. 
 
The original report had specified that the issues of corporate governance 
should be re-examined by a successor committee to be set up no later 
than June 1995.
69 This was to give business a chance to implement the 
Code and to consider its effects. The successor to the Cadbury 










We summarise and highlight the key influence groups on each stage of 
process of the development of the Cadbury Committee in Table 1. 
Again, High indicates significant influence, Low a small influence and 
Medium lies in between, - implies no measurable impact. Initial interest 
in corporate governance was wide-ranging against a background of 
recession (an exogenous factor). Financial stakeholders and accounting 
and legal professions realised the business threat that poor internal 
control and board accountability caused (all were represented on the 
committee). The government took an active interest in the issue given 
the bad light that it shed on the deregulated system that they wished to 
promote. This influence was exercised through encouragement from the 
Bank of England
70 at the time of formation of the Committee and the 
presence of a DTI representative on the Committee. Adrian Cadbury had 
an excellent pedigree as a former company chairman, the head of the 
Bank of England’s enterprise to promote non-executive directors (Pro-
NED) and a member of the Court of the Bank of England. The Bank’s 
influence on the committee also came via the presence of the Bank’s  
advisor on corporate governance on the committee. Public interest and 
media attention on well-publicised failures prompted the formation of 
the Committee. There was only a low-key involvement of corporates in 
the initial phase, largely via Cadbury’s own business background. 
 
Professionals (and their regulators) dominated the formation of the 
Committee, with the Financial Reporting Council taking the lead in 
recruiting members and in setting the terms of reference of the 
Committee. Media interest waned as the investigation progressed. At the 
presentation of the findings Corporates were targeted in order to get 
them to buy in to the findings, their interests were robustly represented 
(by the CBI and vocal individual CEOs) in the subsequent debate and 
their acceptance of the recommendations was the key to successful 
implementation. The media followed the launch of the report and the 
subsequent debate around its recommendations but interest waned over 
the long period between 1992 and 1995 when Cadbury himself made his 
valedictory report on implementation. The Stock Exchange’s agreement 
to make it a listing requirement that companies report on their degree of 
compliance with the Code was an essential element of regulatory 
promotion of the recommendations. 
   







As we noted above it was recognised that a very specific issue that the 
Cadbury Report had not dealt with in great detail was the level (and rate 
of increase) of executive pay.
71 The Cadbury Report had recommended 
the establishment of a Remuneration Committee consisting wholly or 
mainly of non-executive directors, but the details of its policies had not 
been examined.
72 In the two years following the publication of the final 
report this became a hot political issue, with newspapers highlighting 
three year contracts, large perks and large pay increases.
73 Pension funds 
indicated that they wanted to see a greater link between pay and 
performance.
74 The Labour Party opposition, assisted by the newspapers, 
highlighted the issue of ‘fat cat’ pay, particularly latching on to the large  
pay rises which many executives in privatised utilities received. Gordon 
Brown, then Labour’s treasury spokesman, highlighted the fact that 
utility privatisation had created 50 millionaires among executives 
including all 14 of the chairmen of the regional electricity companies.
75 
A rallying point became the 75% pay rise announced in 1994 for the 
chairman of British Gas, Cedric Brown, who then became the target of a 
‘Cedric the Pig’ campaign at the May 1995 British Gas AGM.
76 This 
campaign struck a nerve with the public at a time of relatively high 
unemployment, and independent evidence that revealed that there was 
no discernible link between pay increases and company performance.
77 
At the end of 1994 it was reckoned that £7bn of a total of £10.5bn of 




The issue was highly embarrassing to the government, which was 
already politically unpopular. Ministers were reportedly split on whether 
to approach the CBI to do something or to put pressure on shareholders 
to take action to punish under-performance.
79 The campaign on 
executive pay shed a rather poor light on one of their most spectacularly 
successful policies – utility privatisation – and led to embarrassment at 
perceived market excesses for a pro-business government. Michael 
Heseltine, the Deputy Prime Minister, with responsibility for the 
presentation of government policy, was concerned to distance the 
government from the issue. He reportedly put pressure on the CBI to 
look into the matter and see if something could be done.
80 In public he 
threatened legislation if business did not clean up its act. 
 
 
It was Heseltine who approached Richard Greenbury, chairman of 
Marks and Spencer, to head a committee to look in to the issue of 
executive pay. The committee that Greenbury formed had no formal 
sponsors, but was supported by the CBI which provided for the 
secretarial and publication costs. The committee consisted of seven 






leading investment fund managers.
81 The committee sat for the first time 
in early 1995. The terms of reference were: 
 
‘To identify good practice in determining Directors’ remuneration 
and prepare a Code of such practice for use by UK PLCs.’ 
(Greenbury Report, 1995, para 1.2, p.9) 
 
The committee met at Marks and Spencer’s head offices and produced 
two draft reports before a final report was published in September 1995. 
The interim report had no specific criticism of the pay schemes at 
utilities – the issue that had led to its formation. However this was 
corrected in the final report.
82 There was also a debate about whether 
executive pay should remain the prerogative of the board or should be 




The final report’s recommendations centred around new disclosure 
requirements and the functioning of the remuneration committee made 
up of non-executives, who would determine both individual executive 
pay and pay policy.
84 Remuneration Committee chairmen should be 
directly accountable to shareholders (rather than just the board).
85 There 
were recommendations on the elements of good policy which should be 
focussed on the alignment of the interests of directors and shareholders. 
Remuneration Committees were to give attention to incentivising long-
term performance by avoiding issuing share options at a discount. 
Directors’ service contracts should be a year or less. As with the 
Cadbury Report, enforcement was to be via a statement in the annual 
report by the remuneration committee which would explain any areas of 
non-compliance. Such a statement was to be Stock Exchange listing 
requirement. Annual reports were also to carry details of each individual 









The reaction to the Greenbury Report was largely negative. The Labour 
Party announced that it was not satisfied with the report and that it 
would ban share options for all privatised utilities.
86 The toughness of the 
report was questioned because it allowed British Gas to claim that it was 
now at the leading edge of best practice, simply because it reported its 
policies.
87 There was also a debate about whether share options should 
be treated as income rather than as capital (and hence taxed more 
highly).
88  Both the CBI and IoD expressed worries that the report had 
not gone far enough in regulating business behaviour.
89 Corporates 
complained about the compliance burden that the new code placed on 
them.
90 Only the government seemed satisfied,
91 perhaps because the 
Committee had achieved its political purpose of deflecting a lot of the 
criticism away from it. 
 
The issue of executive pay continued to rumble on long after the Report. 
The Labour Party wrapped it up into the justification for their Windfall 
Tax on utilities plan which they enacted soon after coming to power in 
1997. The issue of executive pay is regularly aired in the newspapers as 
it has continued to rise faster than average earnings and to bear little 
relationship to the underlying performance of companies. If the intention 
of Greenbury was to make pay more responsive to performance, this 
seems to have failed. Indeed it has been claimed that the large amount of 
information on pay which is available has encouraged pay rises, as 
comparisons of executive pay are now easier.
92 However remuneration 
committees in practice do not appear to have much ability to influence 
pay, per se, as they rely on advisors to tell them what the ‘going-rate’ for 
a particular executive is. As one member of the committee puts it ‘the 
answer is obvious from the analysis of pay charts – to the nearest 1000 
pounds’. Executive pay in the UK is determined largely by market 










In 1999 the government initiated a follow-up consultation on directors' 
remuneration.
94 Following a lengthy consultation process by the DTI, in 
March 2001 Stephen Byers, then Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, announced that the government was planning to introduce 
secondary legislation to require quoted companies to publish a report on 
directors’ remuneration in their annual report.
95 The legislation would 
specify the contents of such a report which would include individual 
directors’ remuneration packages, the role of the board’s remuneration 
committee, the boards’ remuneration policy and other disclosure 
requirements including a company performance graph. The stated aim of 
this legal underpinning to the recommendations of the Greenbury Report 
was the desire to strengthen the link between boardroom pay and 
performance. In October 2001 the government further announced that 
the new legislation on boardroom pay would also include a provision for 
an annual resolution to be put to shareholders on whether they accept the 
remuneration report.
96 Whether this will have any value in restraining 




   
The key influence groups at each stage of the process of development of 
the Greenbury  Committee are summarised in Table 2. The table 
indicates the important initial roles for government, media, popular 
feeling and events. All of these influences reflected the fact that the 
privatisations of the 1990s gave rise to huge pay rises for the executives 
involved. British Gas was just one case, indeed it already complied with 
most of the recommendations of Greenbury before the report was 
published and had good corporate governance. However the media were 
able to take such events and highlight them successfully because of 







The government reacted to such events because of political reality. This 
led them to take the lead in the formation of the committee with the help 
of the CBI and the company chairmen involved in the committee. 
Institutional investors were also significant, both on the committee, and 
in putting pressure on companies to reform. These groups continued to 
be significant through the process, with the government threat of 
legislation promoting implementation and the rise of activist fund 
managers pushing for more revelation in annual accounts and asking 
questions of companies that did not comply. The regulators played no 
role until the implementation phase, when listing requirements of the 
Stock Exchange were invoked to enforce the code. Non-financial 
stakeholders, such as individuals as customers of utilities, played some 
role at the beginning of the process 
97. 
 
Interestingly the media and the public played no role in the formation of 
the committee or in the setting of its terms of reference. Greenbury had a 
poor relationship with the media
98 and the committee was made up of 
senior executives and did not consult with the media or the wider public. 
The composition of the committee and its poor interaction with media 
during the whole process undoubtedly contributed to the poor media 
reception of the report. Given the nature of the issue, which meant that 
the problem was largely intractable, the Committee would have done 
well to involve more of its critics in its deliberations in order to achieve 
more of a public consensus on the issue. The benefits for the business 
community of doing this are illustrated in the case of the Company Law 








5. The Hampel Committee or Cadbury II 
 
The Hampel Committee started life in a paragraph
99 of the Cadbury 
Report that specified that the code on corporate governance was to be 
reviewed after 3 years. By 1995 the Cadbury Report, in spite of earlier 
disquiet, had been widely accepted and was viewed as having brought 
about significant and worthwhile changes in behaviour.
100 Only a few of 
the more maverick FTSE100 chairmen continued to speak out against it, 
mainly from those few companies which continued to combine the role 
of chairman and chief executive in the person of a long-standing 
powerful individual.
101 The chairman of the Financial Reporting Council, 
which had been instrumental in setting up the Cadbury Committee, 
announced in April 1995, that there would be a review.
102 However the 
media comment on corporate governance continued to highlight the 
issue of executive pay. Towards the later part of the year it emerged that 
two prospective chairmen had been approached but in the light of the 
difficulties Sir Richard Greenbury was experiencing had turned down 
the opportunity to head ‘Cadbury II’.
103 Eventually in November Sir 
Ronnie Hampel, then chairman of ICI, was announced as head of the 
committee.
104 
   
The committee was established with the support of London Stock 
Exchange, the CBI, the IoD, the Consultative Committee of the 
Accountancy Bodies, the National Association of Pension Funds and the 
Association of British Insurers. Representatives of each of these 
organisations were approached to be on the committee.
105 The 
involvement of the investment community represented by insurance and 
pension fund representatives was a notable addition to the range of 
backgrounds present on the original Cadbury committee and reflected 









The Committee’s terms of reference were: 
 
‘to promote high standards of Corporate governance in the interests of 
investor protection and in order to preserve and enhance the standing of 
companies listed on the Stock Exchange. The committee’s remit will 
extend to listed companies only. Against this background the committee 
will: 
(a)    conduct a review of the Cadbury code and its implementation to 
ensure that the original purpose is being achieved, proposing 
amendments to and deletions from the code as necessary; 
(b) keep under review the role of directors, executive and non-executive, 
recognising the need for board cohesion and the common legal 
responsibilities of all directors; 
(c)   be prepared to pursue any relevant matters arising from the report of 
the Study Group on Directors’ Remuneration chaired by Sir Richard 
Greenbury; 
(d) address as necessary the role of shareholders in corporate governance 
issues; 
(e)    address as necessary the role of auditors in corporate governance 
issues; and 
  (f) deal with any other relevant matters. 
 
Without impairing investor protection the committee will always keep in 
mind the need to restrict the regulatory burden on companies, e.g. by 
substituting principles for detail wherever possible.’ (Hampel Report, 







The first meeting of the committee did not take place until end of 
January 1996.
107 The government was very unpopular and the Labour 
Party was continuing to campaign against executive pay and windfall 
profits from utilities. Labour made it clear that it expected the Hampel 
Committee to provide some clear leadership in the area of governance or 
else it would act in government.
108 A draft Labour Party manifesto in 
June 1996 made it clear that legislation would wait for the outcome of  
the report.
109 There was also a suggestion that the Labour Party might 
establish an expert panel on corporate governance.
110 From the beginning 
however Hampel made it clear that he was not a radical and that radical 
changes were unlikely to be recommended by the committee.
111 
 
The committee met in ICI’s offices and received a large number of 
submissions on the subject of governance.
112 This delayed the publication 
of a draft report until August 1997.
113 In this draft the Committee 
emphasised the need to get back to establishing good principles of 
governance before codes. The City was relieved that the report favoured 
no more radical reform and that the momentum for more corporate 
governance regulation had been stopped.
114 Hampel’s recommendations 
endorsed Cadbury’s original report but did not significantly seek to 
strengthen it. The reaction to the draft was decidedly mixed.
115 Hermes, 
the independent activist fund manager, thought that it had not clarified 
the role of an independent director.
116 The IoD wanted more direction on 
what long-term incentive packages should be offered to executives.
117 
The Industry Secretary, speaking at the CBI conference, indicated that 
the Labour Party (now in government) considered that both corporate 
governance and company law should be beefed up.
 118 The labour unions 
were concerned that nothing was being done to address short termism 
towards investment in the UK.
119 Hampel himself expressed concern 
about the negative reaction to the draft report while there were fears that 









The final report was published towards the end of January 1998. The 
principal recommendations were that companies should include in their 
annual accounts a narrative statement of how they apply ‘the relevant 
principles’ to their particular circumstances. The principles that were 
highlighted were: that chairman and chief executive should be separated 
and if they were not this should be explained; there should be a balance 
between non-executive and executive directors; nomination committees, 
recommended by Cadbury, should be recognised as good practice; and 
that all directors should submit themselves to regular re-election. A lead  
non-executive director should be identified through whom concerns 
could be raised if there was no separation of chair and chief executive. 
The Hampel report stated that individual directors should not take part in 
decisions on their own remuneration package. Remuneration policy 
should remain a matter for the board.
121 The board should maintain a 
sound system of internal control, though it was not specified how it 
should do this. Hampel supported the recommendations of Cadbury that 
audit committees should be made up of non-executive directors. Overall 
the report can be seen as endorsing Cadbury while not recommending 
anything new such as allowing shareholders to vote on executive pay 
packages. 
 
Having been widely discussed at the draft stage there was limited 
reaction to the publication of the final report. However the day after the 
publication Margaret Beckett announced that there would be a 
widespread review of company law.
122 This provoked some pleas from 
the City that self-regulation should be given time to work and that the 
review should not be too wide-ranging.
123 However the Hampel Report 
was widely seen as letting business off lightly.
124 
 
  A combined code, drawing together the Cadbury, Greenbury and 
Hampel recommendations, was published by the London Stock 








By 1998 the UK was widely recognised as leading the world in the area 
of corporate governance.
126 The Cadbury report had had time to filter 
through the leading companies in the UK and several other countries had 
initiated similar reviews of their corporate governance and come to 
similar conclusions, inspired by the Cadbury report. However 
considered comment pointed out that governance reforms had made little 
difference to executive pay and that reforms still did not pass the 
Maxwell test.
127 Governance was not crucial to performance, with 
evidence continuing to suggest that more non-executives on a board did 
not improve performance and that companies combining chief executive  
and chairman tended to do better. The evidence was that governance was 
not the crucial determinant of performance and that self-regulation could 





The key influences in the development of the Hampel Report are 
outlined in Table 3. The Hampel report was foreseen in the Cadbury 
report and the Financial Reporting Council, representing the 
accountancy profession and the Stock Exchange, was the institution that 
ensured the carrying out of the Cadbury recommendation.  The key role 
of the accountancy profession in auditing governance statements might 
explain why professionals were keen to re-examine the issue and if 
possible promote the corporate governance industry. Given the wide-
ranging and initially uncomfortable adjustment following Cadbury, 
corporates had little interest in further reform and other non-financial 
stakeholders had no particular interest. 
 
However corporates were well represented on the committee, especially 
in the person of the chairman. Financial stakeholders were significantly 
represented in pushing for further debate on the accountability of boards 
to shareholders and on the committee itself. The government had little 
influence, in contrast to Greenbury, except in that terms of reference 
reflected concerns about possible legislation. The media, NGOs, popular 
feeling and events played little role. The report appears to have been 
little influenced by the threat of government action, though this was very 
real. This may have been because as the economy recovered and the rate 
of bankruptcies fell corporate governance per se, as opposed to the 
levels of executive pay in particular, was not a matter for political 
concern. The increasingly pro-business stance of the ‘New’ Labour 
Party and the lack of public identification with the issues may have 
meant that the threat of legislation was largely seen as an empty one. 







however seem to coincide closely with the government’s call for a 
fundamental review of Company Law.  
 
6. The Turnbull Committee and Internal Control – tying up 
unfinished business. 
 
The initial impetus to set up the Cadbury Committee had arisen because 
of a lack of adequate internal control systems within the high profile 
corporate failures in the late 1980s. A well functioning internal control 
system should ‘facilitate [a company’s] effective and efficient operation 
by enabling it to respond to…risks. This includes the safeguarding of 
assets from inappropriate use or from loss and fraud, and ensuring that 
liabilities are identified and managed’.
129 Internal control systems do this 
by providing for appropriate oversight of financial transactions 
undertaken by the company through the specification of authority 
structures, appropriate information and communication process and a 
capacity to review the ongoing effectiveness of internal control 
arrangements. 
 
Although the Cadbury Report did discuss the need for effective internal 
control, that did not turn out to be its main focus. It delegated a detailed 
review of internal control to a successor committee. This turned out to 
be the Rutteman Committee which eventually published a long report in 
1994. The Rutteman Report received quite limited coverage and was not 
widely perceived as having closed the matter of appropriate internal 
control systems in UK corporate governance. The Hampel Report 
reiterated the need for a sound system of internal financial control. 
However there was no guidance on what the system should look like 
apart from the requirement that the need for an internal audit function 




The Institute for Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICEAW) 
and the Stock Exchange discussed the need for more detailed guidance 






of reference for a new governance committee that was to conclude the 
work that the Cadbury Committee had started. The committee was 
sponsored by the ICAEW and chaired by Nigel Turnbull, then Chief 
Financial Officer of Rank Group plc and also Chairman of the Technical 
Committee of the 100 Group of leading UK companies. The Institute 
took the lead in suggesting names to the Stock Exchange of who should 
be on the committee. 
 
The Turnbull Report intended to: 
 
‘reflect sound business practice whereby internal control is 
embedded in the business processes by which a company pursues 
its objectives; remain relevant over time in the continually 
evolving business environment; and enable each company to apply 
it in a manner which takes account of its particular circumstances.’ 
(Turnbull Report, 1999, para.8, p.4)  
 
The first meeting took place in late autumn 1998 and the committee met 
monthly until April 1999. The members of the committee were mostly 
trained accountants and the committee was able quickly to produce an 
interim report in April 1999.
131 The earlier Rutteman Report had 
concluded that it was not possible to specify how to improve internal 
control but just internal financial control. The Rutteman Report was 
technical and compliance with it was specified by the Stock Exchange as 
an interim target. However the Turnbull Report attempted to remain 
more general and go back to first principles on how to make sure risk 
management was embedded within the system of the company. The 









The final report was published in September 1999 and specified the 
elements of a sound system of internal control, the process for reviewing 
effectiveness of internal control procedures, the need for a board 
statement on internal control and discussed the appropriateness of 
having an internal audit function. It concluded that the elements of a  
sound system of internal control should be embedded within the 
operations of a company, form part of its culture, be capable of quick 
response to evolving risks and include well specified procedures for 
reporting warning signs. The process for reviewing effectiveness should 
be well defined, involving continuous monitoring and annual 
assessment. The annual board statement on internal control should 
include a statement on how the company has applied the Turnbull code 
principles, state that there is a process in place, summarise the process 
that it has used to review effectiveness and not make any disclosures that 
are misleading. Companies are recommended to have an internal audit 
function. However where they do not have one there should be an annual 
review of the decision not to have one and disclosure in the annual 
report about the presence or absence of an annual review of this 
decision. 
 
The Turnbull Report was short and to the point and generally perceived 
as having completed the work left unfinished by Hampel in this area.
133 
The reaction to the report was positive with business accepting its 
practical recommendations. The report was seen to be timely as 58% of 
businesses surveyed wanted to improve their system of internal 
control.
134 The precise nature of the recommendations mean that they 
may well, quietly, have far reaching effects in reducing the likelihood of 
the sort of scandals that promoted the ten year review of corporate 











The main influences on the Turnbull Report are outlined in Table 4. 
Events had some influence on the setting up of the committee via the 
drivers behind the Cadbury report, the perceived narrowness of the 
subsequent Rutteman report and the unfinished business in the Hampel 
Report. The Stock Exchange (the regulator) and accountancy profession 
were the main actors behind the need to complete the work on reforming 
this aspect of corporate governance. To some extent corporates wanted 
guidance and financial institutions saw the need for guidance (there was 
a representative from the pensions industry on the committee). 
 
The committee was mainly made up of representatives who were 
members of the accountancy profession (8 out of 10 members).
136 This 
reflected the perceived technical nature of the issue and this clearly had 
a big influence on the final recommendations. Although the Hampel 
Committee invited a significant amount of interest at the outset and 
during its deliberations, there is no discernible media or public interest 
in the development of the Turnbull Committee and no government 
influence over it. Corporates were involved in the debate over the 
interim report and were important in accepting and implementing the 
recommendations of the report. Once again, the incorporation of 
reporting requirements into listing rules by the Stock Exchange was an  
important driver of implementation. The report was drafted by the staff 
members from the ICAEW on the committee and the presentation of the 








It is interesting to note that government and private sector interest in 
corporate governance began to diverge ahead of the Turnbull Report. 
The government initiated the company law review shortly after the 
publication of the Hampel Report. This review continues to examine the 
big picture of what companies are for in a modern economy while the 
private sector focuses on filling in some of the details missed in earlier 
reports.  
7. The Company Law Review: the government considers active 
intervention in corporate governance 
 
The election of a Labour government in May 1997 signalled the end of 
the 18 year era of strongly pro-business and largely laissez faire 
Conservative administrations in the UK. In opposition the Labour Party 
had been critical of the government for inaction on the issue of executive 
pay and critical of the lack of progress which private-sector led 
governance initiatives had achieved. The new administration’s first 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Margaret Beckett, was open to 
the possibility of government legislation should the Hampel Report fall 
short of what the government wanted.
137 Following the publication of the 
Hampel Report in January 1998, Mrs Beckett announced a wholesale 
review of Company Law in March 1998. 
 
Company Law covers a large number of pieces of legislation relating to 
the behaviour of companies and their directors (see DTI, 1998). The 
most important current act is the Companies Act 1985 which 
consolidates previous legislation. However the many of the key 
principles in this Act are based on the Joint Stock Companies Act of 
1844 and the Limited Liability Act of 1855. Since these formative pieces 
of legislation there were major consolidations of the law in 1908, 1929 
and 1948. The last major review took place under the Jenkins 
Committee which sat from 1960-62. Thus a pattern of major review 
every twenty or so years was established. By 1997 Company Law was 
generally considered to be well overdue for such a review in the light 
Britain’s entry into the EU and legal developments around the world. 
The government identified a number of issues in need of attention in the 
current legislation: over-formal language; excessive detail; over 









However there was also the issue of corporate governance. The 
introduction to the Company Law Review acknowledged the 
contribution of the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports and that  
‘the issues dealt with under the new (Combined) Code are more suitable 
for best practice than legislation’
139. However it was noted that ‘there 
may however be a need for legislation in certain areas which are not 
covered by the new Code, or where experience shows that some legal 
underpinning is needed.’
140 Some of the example areas for investigation 
are: the duties of directors (in particular whether shareholders should 
have a duty to take other stakeholders’ views into account in addition to 
shareholders), the conduct of AGMs (to encourage shareholder 
resolutions and voting) and shareholder control over executive pay (in 
order to keep executive pay rises down). We note that all of these areas 
were heavily debated in the light of earlier recommendations. Thus 
while the motivation for the process known as the Company Law 
Review was not primarily driven by the perceived failure of private 
sector governance initiatives there is no doubt that the timing of the 
Company Law Review (immediately following Hampel) and its scope 
were influenced by the earlier governance reports. 
 
Thus the terms of reference for the Company Law Review are as 
follows: to consider how core company law can be modernised, to 
consider whether enough legal vehicles exist for business at all levels, to 
consider the proper relationship between company law and non-statutory 
standards of corporate behaviour, to review the extent to which foreign 
companies operating in the UK should be regulated under British Law 









The motivation for the Company Law Review has come from the 
government, strongly influenced by the Law Society. The Company Law 
Review has been conducted by a Steering Group and associated working 
groups. The Steering Group has been responsible for overseeing the 
process and this met once a month while it was in operation between 
1998 and mid-2001. Working groups were chaired by members of the 
steering group and met as often as bi-weekly. The Steering Group was 
chaired by a civil servant from the DTI. The whole process has been 
overseen by a senior official appointed by the DTI, who also sat on each  
of the working groups. The Review has been as inclusive as possible 
with a further Consultative Committee reviewing the work of the other 
groups. The Steering Group has also been responsible for producing a 
number of consultation documents which have taken the process forward 
so far. The Steering Group consisted of broad mix of people including 
academic lawyers, practising lawyers and company executives, 
economists and one journalist.
142 It worked on the basis of consensus. 
 
The Steering Group has produced four major documents in February 
1999, March 2000, November 2000 and July 2001 which develop the 
overall framework and a number of other papers relating to specific 
aspects of the law such as company formation, law concerning overseas 
companies.
143 The final main report (DTI, 2001) includes proposals for 
an inclusive statement of directors’ duties which would require directors 
to take into account the implications for the company over time and of 
wider relationships, such as those with employees, suppliers, customers 
and the wider community. The report also proposes an operating and 
financial review that would allow for greater transparency for public 
companies and large private companies. The report steers clear of the 
issue of executive pay as this was the responsibility of a separate 
consultation. The report has restated a commitment to preserving the 
‘comply or explain’ approach of the Combined Code rather than 









Margaret Beckett moved from Trade and Industry in mid-1998 soon 
after the launch of the Company Law Review.  Since then two more pro-
business ministers held the post until the June 2001 election, and the 
issue of Company Law Review seems to have left the news agenda.
145 
The government is now (November 2001) considering how to respond to 
the Steering Group's final report. The issue of corporate governance is 
much less political than it was ten years ago, with the economy enjoying 
steady economic growth and corporate failures at a low level. It may be 
that it will take a fresh recession and or a new set of corporate scandals 
to reveal sufficient weaknesses in the system of corporate governance to  





The influences on the development of the Company Law Review are 
summarised in Table 5. Although it is not possible to comment on the 
last three stages of the process which have yet to be completed it is 
possible to comment on the other stages. Business has had a 
considerable input into the process mainly via the law profession, with 
additional influences from non-financial stakeholders such trade unions 
concerned about the impacts of merger decisions on jobs. Financial 
stakeholders have had some influence via direct input into the process. 
Corporates’ direct influence especially via their representative trade 
organisations has been limited. 
 
The government was the prime influence group in setting up the review 
process but has gradually withdrawn its direct influence as the process 
has progressed such that the deliberation and compilation of the report 
are the responsibility of the steering group and working groups. 
However it retained some influence via the DTI oversight of the process. 
Public opinion operating through the media and popular opinion has 
tailed away (from an initially low level) as the review has progressed. 
The decline in the interest of these two groups would seem to be an 
explanatory factor in the decline of government interest (although the 
government is committed to a new Companies Act). NGOs have 
retained a significant degree of interest in the process given that many of 
the provisions relate to them and they have been involved in the 
consultation group. The healthy economy throughout the process has 
ensured that there have been no significant exogenous factors 
influencing the process. In contrast to the other investigations into 
governance there has been no role for the Stock Exchange and no formal 









8: Detailed Conclusions 
 
We summarise our main findings on the influences on the corporate 
governance debates in the UK in Table 6. This table highlights the 
nature of the issues involved and the relative influence of the different 
groups on the process and offers an overall assessment of the process 
based on our perceptions, informed by the media and academic 
comment. On the basis of this comparison and the earlier tables 1-5 we 
discuss a number of conclusions in what follows of this paper. 
 
1.    Corporate governance topics attract different levels of public, 
political or media interest. 
 
In general corporate governance is an abstract, technical subject which is 
consequently neither well understood nor of great interest to the public, 
politicians or the media. However, the corporate governance issue can 
attract much higher levels of attention as a result of being associated 
with other issues of public interest. In this case, the issue is not really of 
importance in itself but because of the wider issues that it reminds 
people of.   
 
Table 6 shows that only the issue of executive pay and the associated 
Greenbury Report has attracted sustained public interest. This is perhaps 
because executive pay resonates with many wider issues such as the 
impact of Thatcherite policies on the economy via privatisation. It raises 
some the fundamental issues of the benefits of the free market vs a more 
egalitarian socialist economy. The more general issue of corporate 
responsibility raised by the Company Law Review does not so obviously 
link to politically charged debates and hence initial political interest in 










2. The process of addressing issues of corporate governance has 
significantly influenced the outcome of the individual reports. 
 
It seems very likely that the process of addressing the issue of corporate 
governance in the UK has significantly influenced the outcome. 
 
Table 6 illustrates the links between the conduct of the process on the 
outcome. The Cadbury Committee did an excellent job because they had 
a visionary leader who had an enormous influence on the outcome and 
did a lot of work to debate the issues. The Greenbury Report did little to 
deal with the issue of executive pay rises because it consisted of senior 
executives who benefited from the status quo and hence were unlikely to 
propose radical changes or provide a convincing endorsement for the 
status quo. The Turnbull Report was focused and business-like and had a 
well defined professional task. The Company Law Review has been very 
inclusive but for that reason is unlikely to lead to radical legislation. 
 
3. Corporate influences on the process and content of the Reports have 
been surprisingly weak. 
   
The natural assumption would be that because corporations are most 
affected by the results of corporate governance enquiries, then they 
would also seek to exert the most influence on the process and content. 
 
In fact, companies have had little influence on the early, formative 
stages in the enquiries, of Cadbury, Hampel, Turnbull, the Company 
Law Review. Nor are their representatives, the CBI and the IoD, very 
influential, despite what are probably very considerable efforts to reach 







Corporate interests were probably most clearly taken account of via the 
person of Adrian Cadbury as a company chairman and industrialist. His 
report was governed by a concern to find solutions which companies  
could adopt and change their behaviour. It was the pragmatic enquiry of 
an industrialist. The irony is that Cadbury was not chosen as a result of 
his association with business interests but because of his connections 
with financial interests. He had been a member of the Court of the Bank 
of England and was chairman of the Bank sponsored Pro-Ned. 
 
The Greenbury Committee did have significant representation from 
company chairmen. However, corporate interest was only there because 
the government was pressing them hard in the light of public opinion. 
This committee was a response to very visible outside pressure and did 
not arise because of a corporate desire to shape the debate.  
 
4. The influence of non-governmental bodies and non-financial 
stakeholders on the process and content of the enquiries has been very 
weak. 
 
Lobby groups representing non-financial stakeholders (e.g. trade unions 
and consumer groups) and NGOs might have been expected to have had 
a significant influence on the debate given the stakeholder debate (see 
Hutton, 1995) which has been carried on in and around the debate about 
corporate governance. These groups are vocal and politically influential.    
 
However, our research has not detected much direct influence. The 
governance committees show no representation from these groups and 
little discernible influence on the process or the outcome. There has been 
some involvement of these groups in the Company Law Review but it 
seems likely that the very fact of including them in the process is merely 
to reduce their ability to criticise the outcome. The language of stake-
holding has been very much toned down by the Labour government as 
time has progressed and the consequences of the Company Law Review 
seem unlikely to be particularly radical in increasing the influence of 







5. Institutional investors have had much less influence on the process 
and content of the enquiries than might have been expected. 
 
One might argue that institutional investors, who stand to loose from 
poor corporate governance leading to mismanagement and fraud, have a 
significant interest in corporate governance. Much of the emphasis in 
corporate governance has been on improving the quality of published 
information on companies available to market participants. Investors 
depend on receiving accurate information so that the price represents an 
effective measure of the value of a firm. Institutional investors have 
been the subject of a separate set of investigations and consultations 
initiated by the first Myners Report in 1996.
146 Indeed Adrian Cadbury 
recently suggested that the focus in corporate governance should now 
shift to an examination of their role.
147  
 
Our research seems to indicate that institutional investors (or financial 
stakeholders in Table 6) have had a rather patchy influence. There was 
some influence on the setting up of the Cadbury and Hampel committees 
but very little in the case of Greenbury. Institutional investors have only 
been concerned with the Company Law Review (at the government’s 
invitation) and Turnbull to a limited extent. This probably reflects the 
lack of activism among the investment community in the UK and it is 
notable that it is the activist funds such as Hermes that have made most 
contribution to the debate. 
 
 
6.  Professionals have had a significant influence on the process and 







Corporate governance has long been viewed as a technical subject 
concerned with the robustness and reliability of corporate auditing 
systems. This implies that professionals such as accountants and lawyers 
are likely to be heavily involved in the practice of corporate governance 
and in debates about its reform. Bad corporate governance threatens the 
integrity of such governance professionals, in terms of their public  
reputation, and in terms of professional liability (Robert Maxwell’s 
auditors did pay compensation). The ICAEW and the Law Society are 
well resourced and highly effective. We would therefore expect these 
professional bodies to be keen to influence the governance debate. 
 
Our analysis suggests that accountants were a driving force behind the 
setting up of Cadbury, they had an influence on the terms of reference 
and were well represented on the committee. Similarly, there were 
accountants on Hampel and on the Company Law Review. The trend in 
UK corporate governance towards greater emphasis on measurement, 
audit and reporting undoubtedly reflects the influence of accountants on 
the process of corporate governance. It remains to be seen whether this 
will serve British industry well or whether it will act to reduce 
innovation and entrepreneurship. 
 
7. Political influences on the process and content of the enquiries have 
been variable. 
 
Corporate governance is about the executive power at the heart of 
capitalism. As such we would expect there to be a significant degree of 
political interest and influence. It is potentially an area where political 
influence can be brought to bear at minimal fiscal cost. However 
parliamentary time is scarce, the business lobby powerful and corporate 
governance is not usually a vote winning issue. Thus the expectation of 
political involvement would be a contingent one: where the corporate 
governance resonates with wider issues, there will be political influence, 








The evidence in Table 6 is broadly in line with this argument. Executive 
pay was a burning issue for the government and touched at a number of 
government policies on privatisation, entrepreneurship and tax where the 
government was criticised. The government was most active in the case 
of the Greenbury Report (and the whole issue of directors’ pay) but their 
influence has been much more muted in the case of the other reports.  
The lack of sustained political interest in corporate governance is 
illustrated by the low profile nature of the Company Law Review.   
 
8. Financial Regulators have had a significant influence. 
 
Failures in financial reporting triggered the initial interest in corporate 
governance since 1990. As such it might be expected that financial 
regulators such as the Financial Reporting Council, the Bank of 
England, the Stock Exchange and later the Financial Services Authority 
would have a concern to ensure appropriate steps were taken to improve 
financial reporting. 
 
Corporate governance was initially promoted by the Bank of England 
which was very influential in the formation of the Cadbury Committee. 
It perceived that the integrity of the market system was at stake if 
financial reporting was inadequate. The Bank of England subsequently 
withdrew from the area of corporate governance with the privatisation of 
Pro-NED.
148 The Stock Exchange, in spite of suggestions that it might 
reduce their involvement, has continued to be very influential in the 
formation of subsequent committees and via its underpinning of reform 
via the listing rules. If volunteerism has been effective in the UK it is 
because of the significance of the Stock Exchange in the UK economy 
and power of Stock Exchange required reporting requirements to force 
companies to justify their systems of corporate governance. The 
Financial Reporting Council, as regulators of financial reporting, have 
acted as sponsors of the Cadbury and Hampel Reports.   
 
 
9. Media influence on the process and content of the enquiry has been 
patchy. 
 
One view of the media is that they create issues. Another is that they 
pick up issues which public opinion is concerned about. In the first case 






The evidence is that the media was powerful in recognising the debate 
when there was an event or public issue for it to expose. Thus it featured 
the scandals that led to Cadbury and cases of excessive executive pay 
that provided the background to the Greenbury Committee. Where there 
was no event or public issue as was the case with Hampel and Turnbull, 
the media seems to have had little impact on the debate (Table 6). 
Interestingly, even though the stakeholder argument is one which 
interests the media, the media was not a trigger for the setting up of the 
Company Law Review. 
 
Some of the Committees were better at handling the media than others. 
Cadbury worked closely with the press, as did Hampel. This paid off in 
terms of constructive coverage of the debates and of the final report. By 
contrast Greenbury seems to have made no secret of his dislike for the 
press and this does not appear to have helped the media reaction to his 
report. It is however not clear that a more robust engagement with the 
press about the difficulty of the issue of executive pay would have led to 
a better media reaction to the publication and a reduction in public 
disquiet about the way executive pay was set. 
 




When asked what influenced politics Harold Macmillan famously 
replied: ‘Events dear boy, events’. We might therefore expect that events 
that raise strong public interest in corporate governance, such as 
business failures, shape the conduct and findings of the enquiry set up to 
deal with the event. The conclusion is that events are not a necessary 
condition for an enquiry, but can be a sufficient one.  
 
The conduct and conclusions of the Cadbury report would support this 
hypothesis. The composition of the committee, the financial and 
structural nature of the solution reflects its origins in creative accounting 






Greenbury Committee was also a creature of events. Turnbull, Hampel 
and the Company Law Review were not, except in the weak sense that 
they were the outcome of the earlier Committees. 
 
11. Macroeconomic conditions have influenced the development of the 
debate. 
 
It could be expected that the state of the economy has a significant 
influence on the approach to corporate governance. In a recession there 
is greater fear of company failure, the public feel good factor is weaker 
and executives under pressure to produce results are open to the 
temptation to mis-reporting. In a recession low performers are revealed 
for what they are and are no longer disguised by the buoyancy of the 
economy.  
 
The pattern of macro-economic growth since 1990 tends to support this 
view. Many of the corporate excesses of the 1980s that led to the 
dramatic failures which stimulated the Cadbury Committee were 
exposed when the economy moved into recession. The principal interest 
in corporate governance in the UK has been when the economy was in 
recession in 1989 –92. It was Cadbury who recommended most radical 
changes to the UK system of corporate governance. Since then outside 
interest has diminished during the subsequent long boom. This has 
reduced the pressure for further radical change as evidenced by the less 
significant conclusions of subsequent committees.  
 
 







The debate on corporate governance was initiated in 1990 by business 
itself in an attempt to head off interference from government. In spite of 
the claims of some that self-regulation was not going to be a permanent 
solution following the Cadbury Report
149 this has proved to be the case 
so far. Though there have periodically been threats of fundamental 
reform this not likely to be initiated in the near future. As Morris puts it:  
‘if the Government can avoid legislating, it will owe much to the public 
relations efforts of Cadbury, Greenbury, Tim Melville Ross (IoD), and 
every other great and good member of the ‘something must be done’ 
chorus; at the very least they have proved the City’s willingness to 
respond to public anxiety and media criticism.’
150 The government’s 
recent proposals for legislating on directors’ remuneration are hardly 
radical and seem unlikely to have much restraining effect. 
 
Table 6 clearly shows that business has had the most significant 
influence in the 4 governance committees. It seems likely to have 
exerted a large influence on the conduct of the Company Law Review 
through the constitution of the Steering Group and through the general 
influence of business on the Labour Party which ensures that radical 
changes in corporate governance in the absence of obvious electoral 
advantage – represented by media and public pressure- are unlikely to 
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TABLE 6: Summary Assessment of Influences on the different Governance Debates in the UK 
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